THE LAST PORTUGUESE COLONIAL CAMPAIGN (1961-1974)

Em 2010, o Congresso da Comissão Internacional de História Militar realizou-se em Amesterdão. Eu e o David Martelo tivemos ocasião de apresentar uma comunicação sobre a Guerra Colonial, dando dela uma visão geral e abordando os principais tópicos. Publico agora o texto então apresentado.

 

THE LAST PORTUGUESE COLONIAL CAMPAIGN (1961-1974)

Aniceto Afonso

David Martelo

 

1. The idea of Empire as a historical legacy

The dictatorship that ruled Portugal since 1926 saw the Portuguese empire inherited from the Age of Discovery and the Conference of Berlin, as the essence of the nation and defining condition of Portugal as a people with unique characteristics. It used to its advantage the pride of the Portuguese over the epic era of the discoveries.

The resolutions of the Conference of Berlin forced Portugal to a huge military and financial effort. The climate of insecurity discouraged the influx of immigrants, adding then to the problem the outcome of World War I, which led to the opening of front lines in Angola and Mozambique, both adjoining German territories.

After World War II, Salazar prevented any discussion over the colonial territories, assuming the uncompromising defense of Portugal as a multi-continental and multiracial nation.

In the meantime, with the approval of the UN Charter, an international legal and political framework was being built that would put an end to colonialism.

While the governments of other colonial powers prepared the transfer of authority in colonial territories, Portugal informed the UN (1956) that it did not have any territory under its administration that was not autonomous, as described in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, thereby creating the conditions for the political isolation and the outbreak of armed conflicts. The nationalist movements that were being formed in the Portuguese colonies ended up having the widest support of African partners, the USSR, the non-aligned countries and not few western countries.

At the end of 1960, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved motions that explicitly contradicted the Portuguese position. All territories under Portuguese administration were declared as falling under classification of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

  

2. Beginning of armed struggle in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique

When, in 1961, armed struggle in Angola began, most African colonies had already achieved their independence. The existence of independent countries, sharing borders with the Portuguese territories, became a cause for serious concerns, as were potential bases of operations against these territories.

The actions of the guerrillas began in Angola on February 4th, 1961. Later, on 15th and 16^th March, hundreds of whites, blacks and non-whites were murdered, most of which from the blows of machetes. With the military forces available - 1,500 European troops and about 5,000 natives - and no air assets (helicopters) that could move them quickly to the threatened sites, people had no other recourse than conduct their own defense, until the arrival of rescue parties.

The armed action against the Portuguese presence spilled over to other territories. In Guinea, from 1963 onwards, while in Mozambique, FRELIMO's first action took place in 1964.

The Portuguese Armed Forces found themselves then constrained to a deep restructuring and refocusing of its core mission, from NATO's European commitments to the confrontation of an enemy that would use guerrilla warfare in areas far wider than that of Portugal, with different physical characteristics and located thousands of miles away.

It was necessary a complete change in the type of combat units, in the doctrines to be applied, the amount of troops to mobilize and the type of disposition that would take into account the threats to be faced and the complex logistical issues that would be present.

  

3. The ungrateful task of winning the population

The Portuguese doctrine of counter-insurgency was based on the general principle of winning minds and hearts. It was not for lack of theory or of bureaucratic structures that this conquest maneuver failed, but because of bad practices in the field.

With the exception of populations which were assimilated and urbanized, the target groups of the psychological action of the Portuguese military could be found in three distinct cases: out of the zones of action of the guerrillas; under control of the guerrillas; or in undefined situation of cross-fires or runaway.

For the people living near the barracks or in "not subverted" areas, the army could keep them under control with a good neighborhood policy in which health support was administered, some school activity provided to children and that supported the construction of basic infrastructure - roads, wells, housing and schools.

In areas of low or no presence of the Portuguese authorities, in border areas where the liberation movements were trying to establish themselves and in regions of ethnic conflict, there were still people in the difficult position between crossfires. These unbalanced populations, were of the more difficult approach and relationship, and the Portuguese forces were not able, in general, to draw them and win their confidence.

 As a rule, relations with the population never had in view their integration in a multiracial society, as preached, or their participation in community life. The diminutive benefits received by urban populations or in controlled areas cannot form the basis of analysis of a conflicted relationship, which always put into question the very way of life of most rural populations.

  

4. International support for liberation movements and political isolation of Portugal

After the independence of Malawi and Zambia, in 1964, the siege of Angola and Mozambique tightened, increasing the border points for infiltrations.

But not all countries were hostile to neighbouring Portugal. South Africa, dominated by the white minority, supported the Portuguese military effort, as did Rhodesia, from the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. Thus, a block emerged in the region that supported the permanence of the descendants of European settlers.

In the relations of the Portuguese regime with the world, during the war, we can consider that the vast majority of countries were clearly hostile. And that, of this hostile world, stood up the countries of the socialist bloc, the Third World and the Nordic countries.

Nevertheless, there were also countries that we might consider indulgent (and cooperating), such as Germany, France, Britain the United States and the so called "brother countries", such as Spain and Brazil (the latter after 1964), in spite of their respective different options.

  

5. The ineffectiveness of the grid system and the increase of Special Forces intervention

After some first emergency reinforcements sent to Angola in 1961, the strengthening of the garrison takes the form of a large expedition which, with undeniable enthusiasm, will allow the reoccupation of areas dominated by the Union of Peoples of Angola, over a period of war with a very different feature of what was going to happen from the last quarter of 1961 onwards. Once restored the Portuguese authority, it was decided to occupy the territory in order to highlight the presence of Portuguese troops. Whichever peace was reaching in areas affected by initial terrorism the grid disposition would be adopted, which would last until the end of the war.

This disposition, with the territory divided into sectors, strongly influenced the conduct of the Portuguese troops, because the importance given to the control of the ground, forcing the dispersal of resources made them assume a defensive posture. Furthermore, conditioned by the logistics system, the troops remained with few means to achieve rapid and effective offensive operations, and the initiative passed, largely, to the enemy. They always knew where the Portuguese troops stayed and what their routines were, choosing the best opportunity to attack and enjoying the huge advantage of, without great risk, using the placement of explosive devices on roads and paths, to cause large numbers of demoralizing casualties.

For this type of war, it was necessary to recast the doctrine of the infantry (and the cavalry and artillery, who fought as infantry), highlighting the security techniques, reaction to ambush, tracking and neutralization of mines and traps, along with their preparation for the psychological maneuver.

 Regarding the means to fight, the Portuguese Armed Forces never achieved levels of quality and quantity consistent with the times when the conflict took place. In a war characterized by the actions of fire by surprise, lack of protection for the infantrymen was total, and they operated in areas prone to ambushes with soft skin vehicles.

For this reason, the land-mines warfare became extremely profitable; especially because infantry units were not equipped with rolling minesweepers equipment and the electromagnetic detectors they used were obsolete and rarely assigned to units.

The lack of resources and difficulty to acquire modern communication means added to these difficulties another adverse factor hurting troop morale: the frequent inability to call for air support in a timely manner, not only in combat but for medical evacuation also.

 The lassitude of life within the grid-disposed units caused them to worry especially with their own survival. The absence of modern technology, the reduced mobility and the progressive improvement of means by enemy forces represented a difficult burden to overcome. Then, it is quite understandable the growing importance of the Special Forces (Commandos, Paratroopers and Special Marines), coexisting, therefore, two types of ground forces. On one hand, the Special Forces, well trained, better equipped and possessing highly mobile tactics. Geared to offensive missions, these forces showed aggressiveness and motivation, and occasional extremely violent and high-risk sacrifices were asked of them. On the other hand, there were the grid units, poorly trained, poorly equipped and with low mobility, subject to action by the enemy along the required progression itineraries and in some cases, to the attacks on the barracks, suffering the effects of isolation and discomfort of bad lodgings.

  

6. A policy without the corresponding means

The spirit of routine and gradual discouragement succeeded the enthusiasm felt by troops in 1961.

In Guinea, in 1968, the worsening of the situation conditioned the military disposition to the point of starting to be considered the abandoning of some military facilities. In contrast, it was sought to improve self-defense and the reorganization of the population. The disposition retraction had, however, a negative consequence: this scheme gave the guerrilla forces zones for free, internationally referred to as "liberated zones". From 1973, the PAIGC proved that it was able to force a retraction of the disposition, as was the case of the withdrawal of Portuguese forces from the border post of Guileje.

In Mozambique, the commander-in-chief, General Kaúlza de Arriaga, believed he could reach a major victory by means of a direct action on FRELIMO. With this end in sight, in 1970, he launched operations “Gordian Knot" and "Border". It was a period of intense operational activity, with frequent contacts and mine blasts. The Portuguese forces saw the number of casualties rise to values never before reached, much of which were due to land-mines.

Unlike what happened in conventional operations, the seizing of territory was not part of the objective of the guerrillas, so the forces of FRELIMO had no reluctance in seeking other areas to continue their action. A desirable goal was the hydroelectric power plant of Cahora Bassa, in Tete.

The Portuguese troops were still engaged in both operations and the already mentioned political and military activity of FRELIMO around the dam revealed to be worrying.

But a new front was being opened. The Portuguese government had always sought the support of the Catholic Church, reiterating that Portugal defended the Western Christian civilization in Africa. However, the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations provided the development of an anti-colonial philosophy, which, slowly, would make its way into the mind of the Church. In 1963 the encyclical "Pacem in Terris” of Pope John XXIII came as the first sign of new thinking of the Church on colonial matters.

On July 1, 1970, pope Paul VI received in audience three leaders of the movements that fought Portugal: Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC), Agostinho Neto (MPLA) and Marcelino dos Santos (FRELIMO). This hearing had the symbolism of the final cut of the Church's support to the Portuguese presence overseas.

 

7. Personnel status

In early 1974, the garrisons of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique reached a total strength close to 170,000 men, about 100,000 of whom from the European part of Portugal. It represented, in proportion to their populations, a force more than fourfold that of the U.S. in Vietnam.

 

If the global strength had widened, the same could not be said of the important portion of the framework guaranteed by regular army officers. Young candidates to military academies were fewer and fewer.

 

Levels of conscription had also failed to meet the needs. Since 1967, it had reached the limit of capacity in the metropolis, so it was necessary to resort to local recruitment. Apart from the creation of almost entirely African units, 'mixing' of units from the metropolis, which came to theaters of operations incomplete, was also done, getting full strength with African personnel. The Africanization of the war was far more extensive than we imagine. In Mozambique, for example, locally drafted personnel represented, in 1974, more than half of the garrison.

  

  8. The Portuguese revolution of 25th April 1974 and the end of the Empire

The last year of the war (1974) was deeply marked by political and military unrest in Portugal, by the revolution of April 25th and by the negotiations of cease-fires in the three territories in war.

The struggle of the captains, initially of a corporate nature, began to gain political overtones from the beginning of 1974.

It was also then that the war in Mozambique spread to the center of the territory, affecting areas hitherto considered safe and launching panic among the white population.

In Guinea, the guerrilla intensified actions against several barracks, showing an increasing ground and anti-aircraft firepower. To worsen the circumstances, even in Angola, where an agreement with UNITA had created the illusion of a victory in the East, the situation slipped to an unexpected deterioration. Broken the agreement, UNITA returned to being considered an enemy force.

In February 1974, the book "Portugal and the Future" came out authored by General Antonio de Spinola, a former governor and commander-in-chief of Guinea. By proposing a political solution to the wars in Africa, Spinola became an opponent of the government. This event turned out to strengthen the spirit of rebellion that had already spread among younger officers.

Subsequently, Generals Spinola and Costa Gomes, this one the Chief-of-Defense, did not attend a ceremony in support of overseas policy, organized by the generals of the three services of the Armed Forces, and were discharged by the government.

On April 25, 1974, the revolution came to the streets, and without bloodshed, the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the dictatorship.

After having been published, the Programme of the Movement clearly showed that the measures on the overseas issue, while claiming that the solution was political, not military, were not clear enough to be readily accepted by the movements that fought against Portugal. It was followed, therefore, by a painful process of about three months, with little advance in negotiations. Concerning the military situation, while in Guinea a tacit cease-fire allowed significant advance in the peace process, in Angola and Mozambique the opposite took place, that is the guerrilla movements intensified their action against the Portuguese troops, increasingly demoralized before the hesitation of the political process.

Only from July 26, the day of adoption of Law 7/74 (recognizing the right of the colonies to self-determination and independence), the negotiations with the liberation movements were clarified, leading to the establishment of several cease-fires, a process completed in October 1974. In the meantime, on September 10th, Portugal had recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau.

Talks were then prepared to resolve the main problem in this area: the decolonization of Angola, where there were three movements in arms and not just one. In early 1975, a summit among the three parties and the Portuguese government was held, in which an understanding for the decolonization of Angola was found, a process that, however, would result in a civil war.

In June 1975, the independence of Mozambique was proclaimed and, the following month, the Cape Verde and S. Tome and Principe. Finally, in November 11, already in a climate of civil war, the date for the independence of Angola was reached. The last Portuguese troops who had been present in the Portuguese colonial empire returned to Portugal, and for several years civil conflict in Angola continued, interspersed with foreign military assistance from Zaire, South Africa and Cuba.

The end of the colonial era provided the Portuguese not only the enjoyment of freedom and the realization of what this value implied, but also a reformulation of their destiny. The cycle of the Empire had been closed.