OPERATION "MAR VERDE"

O Congresso da Comissão Internacional de História Militar realizou-se em Turim no ano de 2013. A Comissão Portuguesa esteve presente através de vários representantes, entre os quais eu próprio e o coronel David Martelo. O tema do congresso abrangia as operações conjuntas e operações de forças multinacionais ao longo da História, pelo que nos propusemos abordar a sempre sensível e algo misteriosa operação "Mar Verde". O David Martelo preparou um excelente power point que depois publicou no seu blogue "A Bigorna", que pode ser consultado em: a-bigorna.pt/militar/guerra-naval/

O texto foi depois publicado nas respetivas atas do Congresso e fica aqui.

OPERATION “MAR VERDE”

Aniceto Afonso and David Martelo

Background

In the context of the wider post-World War II decolonization movement, from 1963 to 1974, in the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau, an armed conflict took place between the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) and the Portuguese armed forces. The Portuguese regime, led by Oliveira Salazar, implanted a dictatorship since the beginning of the thirties named «Estado Novo» that fought back the decolonization (the ‘winds of change’ in the words of Harold MacMillan) up to the engagement on three operations theatres against the pro-independence movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The aim of the Nationalist movements was to achieve independence of their territories, supported by a very favourable international environment.

Being its territory relatively small (36,544 km2) and very flat, Guinea-Bissau is located on the western coast of Africa. The coastline is very indented, with an extensive river network playing an important role as communication routes between the sea and the hinterland. Along the coast, one can find a wide complex set of islands with very favourable conditions for joint operations, with emphasis on the use of naval assets.

Guinea-Bissau, having borders with the Republic of Guinea (independent since 1958) and Senegal (independent since 1960) enable both countries to give significant support to the PAIGC and constituted an important sanctuary for military operations launched against the Portuguese military forces stationed in the territory.

The assistance that these two neighbour countries were offering to the PAIGC forces was a matter of concern to the Portuguese government and the military command of the territory, constituting, in his operational concept, an assumed restriction, though not completely sacrosanct. Anyway, there were express recommendations to avoid border violations, which could happen only in extreme situations, and always in a swift manner and as concealed as possible, so that Portugal would never be internationally blamed for those acts. The various occasions the Portuguese forces entered neighbouring countries, thus violating these countries borders, were due to combat actions involving the pursuit of the PAIGC forces as a result of unforeseen incidents and were never too deep in foreign territory.

Whenever an operation planning required a potential or even effective border violation, the Portuguese military command chose to use Infantry and Marines units manned by native personnel (African troops), wearing uniforms and armaments different from those of the Portuguese Army and Navy standard issue, and, when necessary, weaponry from Warsaw Pact countries, similar to those used by the guerrillas and the nationalist fighters.

We are going to present you the synthesis of the only operation of this type planned by the Portuguese command, conducted during the twelve years that the conflict lasted in Guinea-Bissau and that brought lasting and fatal consequences to the Portuguese regime, already with a very weak position in the Concert of Nations. We refer to operation “Mar Verde“ (Green Sea), carried out in November of 1970, in support to a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea.

The idea of executing a larger incursion in the territory of the Republic of Guinea arose in August of 1969, when a raid to release more than twenty Portuguese POW (prisoners of war) held in captivity by the PAIGC in Conakry was for the first time considered. Another objective, that seemed easily achievable, was the destruction of the P6 and Komar patrol boats, owned by the PAIGC and the Republic of Guinea respectively, which were posing a serious threat because they were significantly faster than those of the Portuguese Navy, though they were very vulnerable to a surprise attack when docked in the port of Conakry.

By the end of 1969, being already under way the planning phase of the operation, the Portuguese military command in Bissau, led by general António de Spínola, learned that the Portuguese government was maintaining contacts with dissidents of the president Sékou Touré, since the summer of 1968. They hoped that Portugal supported a coup d’etat to overthrow the regime in Conakry, at least with financial resources and weapons. In return, they offered the establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the liquidation of the PAIGC in Guinea-Conakry. At that stage of the negotiations, it was not demanded to the Portuguese authorities to use the territory of Guinea-Bissau as the departure base for the operation. Instead, the territory of Ivory Coast was envisioned.

Having the Portuguese government accepted to collaborate with the opponents of Touré – where the “Front National de Libération Guinéen” (FNLG), headed by Paul Dechanbenoit, stands out –, the idea of a raid gained the strategic dimension of a coup d’etat, something that was not on the initial plans of the military command of Bissau. The change of regime in Conakry and the agreed neutralization of the PAIGC in the country would constitute a blow in the political and military capabilities of the pro-independence movement.

The more than two years elapsed from the date of the first approach made by Guinean dissidents to the government of Lisbon until the triggering of the operation clearly show the doubts that the Portuguese authorities had regarding the capabilities of the rebels. Therefore, the already existing planning to raid Conakry remained as the basis for the operation.

From conception to final execution, the operation was always commanded by lieutenant-commander Alpoim Calvão, a Marine Officer of the Portuguese Navy, backed up by the Portuguese military command in Guinea and by the highest Portuguese political authorities. From the declassified report of the operation, it is possible to extract the mission assigned to the force led by Calvão: 

• To carry out a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea, in order to allow the rise to power of a government favourable to the “high interests of the Nation”;
• In parallel with this action, assault the PAIGC premises in Conakry, in order to cause casualties and psychological damage, destroy material and release the 26 Portuguese military held captive by the movement.

Both parts of the mission had very different probabilities of success. The execution of the coup d'etat would be favoured by the Portuguese raid, but the success of its execution was very dependent on the performance of the FNLG force and its supporters in Conakry. Moreover, in both cases – but in particular in what was concerned to the coup d'etat – the reliability of the intelligence that would support the planning was of paramount importance for the success of the operation.

Commander-in-Chief António de Spínola’s personal commitment in the operation is fairly obvious in his letter, mailed from Bissau on the 12th of November 1970, and addressed to the Prime-Minister Marcelo Caetano (who replaced Oliveira Salazar, in 1968) one week prior the beginning of the operation, in which the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief clearly states:

«Personally, I assume full responsibility for the operation, running the necessary risks, because I’m firmly convinced that, notwithstanding the unquestionable accomplishment in the scope of a social counter-revolution, we will irremediably lose Guinea if we do not neutralize the enemy abroad».[1]

Within the Portuguese government, the question was not peaceful, contrasting the support granted by the Prime-Minister with the opposition expressed by the Defence Minister and the Overseas Minister, both concerned with the international repercussion of such a dangerous initiative.

 

Preparation

The capital city of the Republic of the Guinea has a sui generis configuration, due to being located in a peninsula with an extensive isthmus. In the perspective of an amphibious attack, this configuration has the advantage of presenting all the targets at a short range from the sea.

On the 17th of September 1969, when the final decision on the operation was still pending, Alpoim Calvão led a reconnaissance operation to the city of Conakry, due to the fact that the available intelligence (provided by the relevant Portuguese services) was very insufficient and outdated. The reconnaissance operation was conducted by the patrol boat Cassiopeia, previously disguised as a fishing boat. At 02H00, sailing from the south, entered in the canal between the islands of Loos and Conakry and stood poised in the most favourable point for collecting data through the radar, in particular the shape and location of the new piers. At 03H00 the mission was considered completed and Cassiopeia sailed back to base.

In January 1970, the operational base for the preparation of the operation was established in the island of Soga, in the archipelago of Bijagós. Concurrently, the recruitment and gathering in Soga of the FNLG combatants was initiated from their places of exile: Sierra Leone, Gambia and Senegal. Most of these combatants were collected by Portuguese Navy units in seashores of countries they were, in small covert operations, previously coordinated with the FNLG leadership.

On the island of Soga, in complete secrecy, these FNLG elements underwent an adequate military training. Ultimately, 150 FNLG elements where declared combat ready and approximately twenty more militias of the Portuguese Guinea joined them as they had a fair knowledge of the Guinea-Conakry territory. Because they were not part of the Portuguese Armed Forces, these combatants were commanded by former French Colonial Army Officers and NCOs, being the most senior in command Diallo Thierno, a former Major. Nevertheless, Portuguese officers and non-commissioned officers were responsible for their training.

Just five days prior to the departure for Conakry, the Portuguese regulars joined the rest of the force in the island of Soga – native black Marines and Army African Commandos, comprising of one African Commando Company (150 men) and a Detachment of African Marines (80 men). All the personnel involved in the operation wore uniforms different from the Portuguese ones and the armament was of Soviet type. Nobody carried anything that could, in case of capture, compromise Portugal. The few Caucasian personnel that went ashore were ordered to darken the visible parts of their bodies.

The transport of these troops was carried out in six vessels: four “Argos class” Patrol Boats and two large Landing Craft Utilities. The force, under the command of Alpoim Calvão, took the name Task Group 27-2 (TG 27-2).

  

Concept of Operation

Some of the tasks established for the military action were given top priority, from which success depended the execution of the remaining ones. The priorities were as follows: 

• Destruction of the enemy's naval assets (PAIGC and Republic of Guinea);
• Neutralization of the Guinean Air Force aircrafts landed at their home base (including the Mig-17), key action for the prosecution of the operations;
• Neutralization of the land forces at their barracks.

The successful achievement of this sequence of actions should permit, not only a victorious coup d’etat, but also the success of the remaining missions being the most important: the attack to the PAIGC facilities in Conakry, the elimination or capture of the leaders and the liberation of the Portuguese prisoners.

The forces were organized in various assault teams, each corresponding to the following objectives: 

ALFA - Presidential Palace

BRAVO - Minister of Interior

CHARLIE - Gendarmerie HQ

DELTA - Ministers Béavogui and Sayfoulah Djallo residence

ECHO - Gendarmerie

FOXTROT - La Paternelle (Cubans)

GOLF - Post Office

HOTEL - Radio Boulbinet

INDIA - Electrical power plant

MIKE - Samory barracks

OSCAR - Republican Guard

PAPA - Isthmus

SIERRA - Airport

VICTOR - Patrol Boats

ZULU - PAIGC

On November 19th, eve of the departure, the commander-in-chief António de Spínola went to the island of Soga, to meet with the troops.

At 20H00, on November 20th 1970, TG 27-2, led by Alpoim Calvão, sailed away from the island of Soga. A P2V5 Portuguese Air Force plane overflew the Task Group, surveying the status of the route. Other air assets were kept on alert in support of the operation, particularly during the return to base.

The following day (21st), the ships reached unnoticed the outskirts of Conakry, at approximately 20H00. At the spreading point, each of the six vessels manoeuvred to the most suitable location for landing the teams on both shores of the city peninsula. The patrol boat Orion, flagship of the operation, anchored NNW of the jetty protecting the harbour, half a mile distant. Out of the remaining ones, three others anchored north of the city and the other two headed south.

  

Execution

The action was triggered at 01H45 on the 22nd, a Sunday, with complete surprise, when only nightlife places were open.

VICTOR team left Orion on rubber boats and headed for the break-water and the pier where the ships to be neutralized were moored. Once the sentry was eliminated, the team members entered the P6 patrol boats and started various fires by throwing hand grenades through the hatches. Running across the pontoon, they did the same to the three Komar who were alongside the wharf on the north side, returning afterward to the Orion.

In the meantime, team HOTEL left the landing craft Bombarda, in two rubber boats, in order to take control over Radio Boulbinet. However, after coming ashore, the team leader, a Portuguese officer, got confused and therefore unable to accomplish the mission. Consequently, the proclamation of the FNLG was never broadcasted.

Then, in two waves, rubber boats landed teams ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF. In the Gendarmerie barracks, initial strong resistance was found, but ultimately dominated; the remaining targets, in downtown Conakry, were seized with little opposition. However, Sekou Touré was not found at the presidential palace.

In turn, teams ÓSCAR, INDIA and MIKE, departure from the Large Landing Craft Montante, towards their objectives. The first, in rubber boats, headed the Republican Guard barracks. Here, after a fierce combat, achieved the complete control of the site, freeing about 400 existing prisoners. Teams INDIA and MIKE came ashore directly from the landing craft, that came alongside in the Yacht Club pier. Team INDIA managed to control the power plant, after neutralizing the guards. The power outage that followed plunged the city into darkness, contributing to the disorientation of the local forces.

Team MIKE marched for a kilometre and occupied, without resistance, Camp Samory, facing, subsequently, a motorized force that showed up at the site.

Team ZULU left the patrol boats Dragão and Cassiopeia in ten rubber boats, managing to reach land only at 02H15. Split into three groups, the first one headed to La Montaigne prison, where all the 26 Portuguese soldiers were held in captivity. After a short but violent combat with the local garrison, all the POW were released. The second group attacked the PAIGC headquarters, destroying buildings and vehicles and shooting down some fighters. Amílcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC, was absent abroad, which was not known. The third group stormed the militia camp and Villa Silly, alternative residence of Sekou Touré, but he was not there either.

Finally, when team SIERRA came ashore, with the mission to occupy Conakry airport and to destroy the existing Mig-17 fighters planes, heavy gunfire was in progress in the city. The team went on a forced march up to the airport, which was seized without resistance. However, no Migs were there to be found.

It was during this march to the airport that Commando 1st Lieutenant Januário, a native of Portuguese Guinea and previously highly decorated by the Portuguese authorities, defected with twenty of his men.

The absence of the Migs caused a great deal of concern to the leadership of the operation, as it could give the enemy aerial supremacy. In such circumstances, an air attack against the fleet, at first light, was a likely prospect. This led Alpoim Calvão to terminate the operation at approximately 04H30, ordering the reembark of all forces. Finding out that the FLNG influence in Conakry was much less significant than what their leaders had promised was another factor contributing to this decision. Even so, some of the FLNG militants who took part in the operation chose to remain in Conakry, where, in the following days, engaged in fighting against Touré’s troops, although without any success.

The reembark took longer than desirable until the break of dawn.

According to the Portuguese military reports, the teams retrieval vessel manoeuvres were observed by a crowd of Guineans, who applauded enthusiastically the Portuguese military, believing they were witnessing the fall of Sékou Touré’s regime. As soon as all the teams were back on board, TG 27-2 sailed to the island of Soga, where it arrived by 16H25 the following day, November 23rd. The Portuguese suffered three dead and nine wounded (military), and inflicted to the enemy casualties estimated to be at about 500 killings (military and civilian).

  

Final remarks

From a strategic point of view, Operation “Mar Verde” was a complete failure. Touré’s regime trembled but did not fall and the position of the PAIGC in Guinea was not altered. It should be emphasized the success obtained with the destruction of patrol boats and the release of 26 Portuguese POW.

Following the operation, whose authorship the Portuguese government refused to recognize, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, at the request of the Republic of Guinea, and an approved resolution demanded «immediate withdrawal of all armed forces and of all foreign mercenaries» out of the Republic of Guinea. On December 8th, resolution 290 of the Security Council was adopted, explicitly condemning Portugal for the invasion of Guinea and, for the first time, considering «the presence of Portuguese colonialism in Africa a serious threat to peace and security of independent African states». The resolution was adopted with 11 votes in favour; France, Spain, Great Britain and the United States abstained.

The idea still remaining nowadays is that the action against Conakry was a “shot in the dark”, far from the usual policy followed by the Portuguese government in developing friendly relations with the authorities and the populations of neighbouring countries, though hardly ever with success. The execution of such an operation always raised many questions, because if it had the success that their mentors and performers intended, that could trigger an escalation of violence, always unfavourable to the Portuguese regime and its colonial policy.

---

[1] ANTUNES, Freire, Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, Publicações D. Quixote, Lisboa, 1985, Vol. I, p. 149.