APRESENTAÇÃO DA "GUERRA COLONIAL"

No dia 7 de maio de 2021, no âmbito da celebração da Literatura e da Língua Portuguesa, eu e o Carlos de Matos Gomes fizemos a apresentação, na Associação 25 de Abril, do nosso livro "Guerra Colonial, recentemente editado pela Porto Editora. A Profª Maria Paula Meneses fez uma apreciação da obra e lançou alguns desafios para o futuro no âmbito dos estudos que falta fazer.

Deixo aqui a minha intervenção, antes do debate que depois se seguiu.

Gostaria de, em nome dos autores, agradecer à Porto Editora por ter suportado este projeto, numa altura em que os projetos editoriais são arriscados. Sabíamos que já fazia falta.

Agradecemos também à A25A, no fundo a nossa segunda casa, por incluir este lançamento, ou melhor, esta apresentação do nosso livro no seu programa de celebração da literatura e da língua portuguesa.

Queremos manifestar a nossa gratidão e acentuar o privilégio que é para nós termos a Profª Maria Paula Meneses, moçambicana e académica distinta, para nos acompanhar nesta apresentação. Muito obrigado pela sua presença e pelo seu trabalho desenvolvido no Centro de Estudos Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra sobre este e outros assuntos, normalmente relacionados com África e os novos países.

Muito obrigado, pois.

  

Gostaria de fazer um pouco de história sobre o livro que hoje apresentamos.

Em primeiro lugar, eu e o Carlos trabalhamos juntos há mais de 30 anos. Por volta de 1991 fui ter com ele ao Regimento de Lanceiros na Calçada da Ajuda e expliquei-lhe como gostaria de abordar a Guerra Colonial numa secção que o Prof. João Medina me tinha encarregado de organizar para a sua obra “História de Portugal”, que viria a ser publicada em 1993.

Propus então ao Carlos que juntássemos um texto meu, trazido com algumas alterações da “História Contemporânea de Portugal” também dirigida pelo Prof. João Medina e publicada em 1985, a um álbum fotográfico por ele comentado, dando-lhe uma estrutura abrangente, focando os vários aspetos da guerra que nos pareciam relevantes. Definidas, assim, as linhas essenciais, chamámos ao álbum “Imagens da guerra colonial”, mas não foi ele o autor, foi sim o Carlos Vale Ferraz. Só que nessas 38 páginas ficou em espera um projeto maior, já devidamente estruturado. A primeira série fotográfica devidamente comentada, como todas as outras, chama-se “Salazar, o regime e as Forças Armadas” e o último chama-se “Os rituais da vida e da morte – os mistérios”.

Em 1995, dois anos depois da “História de Portugal”, numa altura em que a questão da guerra colonial se discutia já com certa efervescência, na imprensa e nas televisões, com inúmeros debates, entrevistas e comentários (vem a propósito recordar que há muitos anos que se discute e se analisa a guerra colonial, contrariamente ao que ainda muitos pensam insistindo em que nada está feito!), como dizia, chegou-nos nessa altura uma proposta de um administrador do Diário de Notícias, amigo do Carlos, Alberto do Rosário, para escrevermos uma obra de fôlego sobre a guerra colonial, a publicar em fascículos distribuídos com o jornal.

Dedicámo-nos inteiramente ao projeto durante os dois anos seguintes e a publicação iniciou-se no dia 5 de outubro de 1997 e terminou um ano depois, com 52 fascículos semanais, com uma tiragem de cerca de 30.000 exemplares distribuídos gratuitamente com o jornal, às quintas-feiras. Centenas de leitores (antigos combatentes e da geração seguinte) colecionaram os fascículos e encadernaram a obra na capa respetiva fornecida pelo jornal.

Nessa época, a publicação excedeu as expectativas que todos tínhamos, chegando a influenciar a estatística de vendas do jornal.

Nesses dois anos visitámos todos os arquivos militares com grande assiduidade, consultámos camaradas e amigos, entrevistámos personalidades e combatentes, juntámos um conjunto de especialistas que se encarregaram de assuntos que não nos parecia possível podermos abranger em tão pouco tempo.

A organização dos temas para publicação em fascículos revestiu-se de características especiais em que a imagem desempenhou um papel essencial. Na altura não estavam disponíveis os milhares e milhares de imagens que hoje se encontram à disposição de todos em várias plataformas e redes sociais da internet. Recordo com admiração o diretor gráfico da obra, José Maria Ribeirinho, de quem nos tornámos amigos.

Lembro que logo em 2000, a Editorial Notícias, pela mão do nosso amigo Alexandre Manuel, publicou a obra num único volume, sem grandes alterações, que teve também larga difusão.

Passados poucos anos ambas as edições estavam esgotadas.

Nós nunca deixámos de pensar em publicar uma nova edição, revista e atualizada, mas os anos foram passando e ninguém se atreveu a deitar mãos à obra (literalmente falando…).

Até que em 2019 a Porto Editora deu o passo em frente para a publicação de uma edição atualizada. Foi assim que surgiu esta edição que hoje apresentamos.

Em que é que ela é nova?

Em primeiro lugar, a sua estrutura temática nada tem a ver com a edição original. Os assuntos estão organizados de forma ordenada, dos mais gerais para os mais particulares, dos mais antigos para os mais recentes, procurando sempre abranger um e o outro lado da guerra.

Em segundo lugar, são aprofundados assuntos que apenas eram aflorados na 1ª edição: a compreensão do sistema colonial e da responsabilidade de Salazar e do Estado Novo; a situação em 1961; o papel dos três Ramos das Forças Armadas; a evolução da capacidade política e militar dos movimentos de libertação; a manobra das populações; e finalmente, de forma inédita, a discussão sobre a guerra ganha/guerra perdida, com aprofundamento de uma visão para o interior do regime e do seu desmoronamento, assim como da aliança secreta Alcora, entre Portugal e a África do Sul.

 

Apresentadas estas considerações sobre a obra, que o Carlos completará conforme entender, gostaria ainda de salientar alguns outros pontos.

Em primeiro lugar gostaria de vos transmitir o nosso compromisso com a História. De forma simplificada, nós entendemos que a História se cumpre em várias fases.

Uma primeira fase de estudo (o que implica um imenso trabalho, de investigação, recolha de testemunhos, leituras, estabelecimento de cronologias, reconhecimento de protagonistas, etc., etc.).

Uma segunda fase, ou fase de reflexão, que nos leva à descoberta de relações, de antagonismos, de interesses, de estruturas, do ambiente político e social, do pensamento e das mentalidades, das leis e do direito, dos movimentos de rotura e suas resistências, dos conhecimentos e dos avanços da época e de tudo o que nos permite colocar-nos no tempo dos acontecimentos. É nesta fase que se situam, para nós, as análises, as explicações, os juízos, as conclusões sobre a História e sobre a sua época. Ou, numa palavra, a sua contextualização.

Finalmente, existe uma fase de intervenção. É a fase do nosso tempo, aquela em que conseguimos, ou não, aproveitar os ensinamentos que trazemos das visitas que fizemos ao passado. É a vida real, aquela que queremos e podemos alterar, como cidadãos interessados e intervenientes, como aproveitadores das lições da História.

Em síntese, podemos dizer que o passado não pode alterar-se, mas que ele pode servir para nos alertar e para influenciar o presente. Basta que sejamos capazes de nos servir das lições que com ele aprendemos. Basta que possamos transmitir o que trazemos, não apenas da nossa experiência, mas sobretudo das experiências que conhecemos do nosso estudo e da nossa reflexão sobre as épocas que nos precederam. Eu julgo que é esse o papel fundamental do historiador.

Contudo, deixo-vos ainda uma última palavra, que me parece indispensável. Nós somos todos diferentes. Por isso só a Liberdade, conquistada em 25 de Abril de 1974, conjugada com os valores democráticos e com a prática dos seus princípios, nos permite garantir a convivência, o reconhecimento do outro, o respeito pelos direitos, a conquista de avanços, a correção de rumos, a denúncia de excessos. Ou seja, só nós, como cidadãos conscientes e participantes, poderemos melhorar a vida comum, adotar os valores de uma sociedade avançada, defendermos, no nosso tempo, os princípios hoje consolidados das relações humanas e sociais, para garantirmos um futuro melhor para nós e para quem nos vai suceder.

No fundo, o que desejo dizer-vos é que a guerra, objeto deste nosso estudo, nos deve alertar para o perigo de se iniciar qualquer conflito armado, de admitir qualquer situação de domínio imposto, de justificar violências injustificáveis, de absolver abusos e prepotências, de aceitar sistemas e sociedades agressivas e discriminatórias.

Ou seja, o historiador razoável é o que tem a noção do seu papel, explica os contextos e a sua evolução, reflete sobre os conhecimentos que adquiriu, transmite o seu saber e intervém como cidadão informado, no seu tempo.

Podem crer que essa tem sido a motivação para esta segunda parte da minha vida, ligada à História, em companhia, quase sempre, do Carlos de Matos Gomes, meu companheiro neste esforço de alerta sobre a guerra e sobre a vida.

OPERATION "MAR VERDE"

O Congresso da Comissão Internacional de História Militar realizou-se em Turim no ano de 2013. A Comissão Portuguesa esteve presente através de vários representantes, entre os quais eu próprio e o coronel David Martelo. O tema do congresso abrangia as operações conjuntas e operações de forças multinacionais ao longo da História, pelo que nos propusemos abordar a sempre sensível e algo misteriosa operação "Mar Verde". O David Martelo preparou um excelente power point que depois publicou no seu blogue "A Bigorna", que pode ser consultado em: a-bigorna.pt/militar/guerra-naval/

O texto foi depois publicado nas respetivas atas do Congresso e fica aqui.

OPERATION “MAR VERDE”

Aniceto Afonso and David Martelo

Background

In the context of the wider post-World War II decolonization movement, from 1963 to 1974, in the Portuguese colony of Guinea-Bissau, an armed conflict took place between the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde) and the Portuguese armed forces. The Portuguese regime, led by Oliveira Salazar, implanted a dictatorship since the beginning of the thirties named «Estado Novo» that fought back the decolonization (the ‘winds of change’ in the words of Harold MacMillan) up to the engagement on three operations theatres against the pro-independence movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. The aim of the Nationalist movements was to achieve independence of their territories, supported by a very favourable international environment.

Being its territory relatively small (36,544 km2) and very flat, Guinea-Bissau is located on the western coast of Africa. The coastline is very indented, with an extensive river network playing an important role as communication routes between the sea and the hinterland. Along the coast, one can find a wide complex set of islands with very favourable conditions for joint operations, with emphasis on the use of naval assets.

Guinea-Bissau, having borders with the Republic of Guinea (independent since 1958) and Senegal (independent since 1960) enable both countries to give significant support to the PAIGC and constituted an important sanctuary for military operations launched against the Portuguese military forces stationed in the territory.

The assistance that these two neighbour countries were offering to the PAIGC forces was a matter of concern to the Portuguese government and the military command of the territory, constituting, in his operational concept, an assumed restriction, though not completely sacrosanct. Anyway, there were express recommendations to avoid border violations, which could happen only in extreme situations, and always in a swift manner and as concealed as possible, so that Portugal would never be internationally blamed for those acts. The various occasions the Portuguese forces entered neighbouring countries, thus violating these countries borders, were due to combat actions involving the pursuit of the PAIGC forces as a result of unforeseen incidents and were never too deep in foreign territory.

Whenever an operation planning required a potential or even effective border violation, the Portuguese military command chose to use Infantry and Marines units manned by native personnel (African troops), wearing uniforms and armaments different from those of the Portuguese Army and Navy standard issue, and, when necessary, weaponry from Warsaw Pact countries, similar to those used by the guerrillas and the nationalist fighters.

We are going to present you the synthesis of the only operation of this type planned by the Portuguese command, conducted during the twelve years that the conflict lasted in Guinea-Bissau and that brought lasting and fatal consequences to the Portuguese regime, already with a very weak position in the Concert of Nations. We refer to operation “Mar Verde“ (Green Sea), carried out in November of 1970, in support to a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea.

The idea of executing a larger incursion in the territory of the Republic of Guinea arose in August of 1969, when a raid to release more than twenty Portuguese POW (prisoners of war) held in captivity by the PAIGC in Conakry was for the first time considered. Another objective, that seemed easily achievable, was the destruction of the P6 and Komar patrol boats, owned by the PAIGC and the Republic of Guinea respectively, which were posing a serious threat because they were significantly faster than those of the Portuguese Navy, though they were very vulnerable to a surprise attack when docked in the port of Conakry.

By the end of 1969, being already under way the planning phase of the operation, the Portuguese military command in Bissau, led by general António de Spínola, learned that the Portuguese government was maintaining contacts with dissidents of the president Sékou Touré, since the summer of 1968. They hoped that Portugal supported a coup d’etat to overthrow the regime in Conakry, at least with financial resources and weapons. In return, they offered the establishment of diplomatic relations with Portugal and the liquidation of the PAIGC in Guinea-Conakry. At that stage of the negotiations, it was not demanded to the Portuguese authorities to use the territory of Guinea-Bissau as the departure base for the operation. Instead, the territory of Ivory Coast was envisioned.

Having the Portuguese government accepted to collaborate with the opponents of Touré – where the “Front National de Libération Guinéen” (FNLG), headed by Paul Dechanbenoit, stands out –, the idea of a raid gained the strategic dimension of a coup d’etat, something that was not on the initial plans of the military command of Bissau. The change of regime in Conakry and the agreed neutralization of the PAIGC in the country would constitute a blow in the political and military capabilities of the pro-independence movement.

The more than two years elapsed from the date of the first approach made by Guinean dissidents to the government of Lisbon until the triggering of the operation clearly show the doubts that the Portuguese authorities had regarding the capabilities of the rebels. Therefore, the already existing planning to raid Conakry remained as the basis for the operation.

From conception to final execution, the operation was always commanded by lieutenant-commander Alpoim Calvão, a Marine Officer of the Portuguese Navy, backed up by the Portuguese military command in Guinea and by the highest Portuguese political authorities. From the declassified report of the operation, it is possible to extract the mission assigned to the force led by Calvão: 

• To carry out a coup d’etat in the Republic of Guinea, in order to allow the rise to power of a government favourable to the “high interests of the Nation”;
• In parallel with this action, assault the PAIGC premises in Conakry, in order to cause casualties and psychological damage, destroy material and release the 26 Portuguese military held captive by the movement.

Both parts of the mission had very different probabilities of success. The execution of the coup d'etat would be favoured by the Portuguese raid, but the success of its execution was very dependent on the performance of the FNLG force and its supporters in Conakry. Moreover, in both cases – but in particular in what was concerned to the coup d'etat – the reliability of the intelligence that would support the planning was of paramount importance for the success of the operation.

Commander-in-Chief António de Spínola’s personal commitment in the operation is fairly obvious in his letter, mailed from Bissau on the 12th of November 1970, and addressed to the Prime-Minister Marcelo Caetano (who replaced Oliveira Salazar, in 1968) one week prior the beginning of the operation, in which the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief clearly states:

«Personally, I assume full responsibility for the operation, running the necessary risks, because I’m firmly convinced that, notwithstanding the unquestionable accomplishment in the scope of a social counter-revolution, we will irremediably lose Guinea if we do not neutralize the enemy abroad».[1]

Within the Portuguese government, the question was not peaceful, contrasting the support granted by the Prime-Minister with the opposition expressed by the Defence Minister and the Overseas Minister, both concerned with the international repercussion of such a dangerous initiative.

 

Preparation

The capital city of the Republic of the Guinea has a sui generis configuration, due to being located in a peninsula with an extensive isthmus. In the perspective of an amphibious attack, this configuration has the advantage of presenting all the targets at a short range from the sea.

On the 17th of September 1969, when the final decision on the operation was still pending, Alpoim Calvão led a reconnaissance operation to the city of Conakry, due to the fact that the available intelligence (provided by the relevant Portuguese services) was very insufficient and outdated. The reconnaissance operation was conducted by the patrol boat Cassiopeia, previously disguised as a fishing boat. At 02H00, sailing from the south, entered in the canal between the islands of Loos and Conakry and stood poised in the most favourable point for collecting data through the radar, in particular the shape and location of the new piers. At 03H00 the mission was considered completed and Cassiopeia sailed back to base.

In January 1970, the operational base for the preparation of the operation was established in the island of Soga, in the archipelago of Bijagós. Concurrently, the recruitment and gathering in Soga of the FNLG combatants was initiated from their places of exile: Sierra Leone, Gambia and Senegal. Most of these combatants were collected by Portuguese Navy units in seashores of countries they were, in small covert operations, previously coordinated with the FNLG leadership.

On the island of Soga, in complete secrecy, these FNLG elements underwent an adequate military training. Ultimately, 150 FNLG elements where declared combat ready and approximately twenty more militias of the Portuguese Guinea joined them as they had a fair knowledge of the Guinea-Conakry territory. Because they were not part of the Portuguese Armed Forces, these combatants were commanded by former French Colonial Army Officers and NCOs, being the most senior in command Diallo Thierno, a former Major. Nevertheless, Portuguese officers and non-commissioned officers were responsible for their training.

Just five days prior to the departure for Conakry, the Portuguese regulars joined the rest of the force in the island of Soga – native black Marines and Army African Commandos, comprising of one African Commando Company (150 men) and a Detachment of African Marines (80 men). All the personnel involved in the operation wore uniforms different from the Portuguese ones and the armament was of Soviet type. Nobody carried anything that could, in case of capture, compromise Portugal. The few Caucasian personnel that went ashore were ordered to darken the visible parts of their bodies.

The transport of these troops was carried out in six vessels: four “Argos class” Patrol Boats and two large Landing Craft Utilities. The force, under the command of Alpoim Calvão, took the name Task Group 27-2 (TG 27-2).

  

Concept of Operation

Some of the tasks established for the military action were given top priority, from which success depended the execution of the remaining ones. The priorities were as follows: 

• Destruction of the enemy's naval assets (PAIGC and Republic of Guinea);
• Neutralization of the Guinean Air Force aircrafts landed at their home base (including the Mig-17), key action for the prosecution of the operations;
• Neutralization of the land forces at their barracks.

The successful achievement of this sequence of actions should permit, not only a victorious coup d’etat, but also the success of the remaining missions being the most important: the attack to the PAIGC facilities in Conakry, the elimination or capture of the leaders and the liberation of the Portuguese prisoners.

The forces were organized in various assault teams, each corresponding to the following objectives: 

ALFA - Presidential Palace

BRAVO - Minister of Interior

CHARLIE - Gendarmerie HQ

DELTA - Ministers Béavogui and Sayfoulah Djallo residence

ECHO - Gendarmerie

FOXTROT - La Paternelle (Cubans)

GOLF - Post Office

HOTEL - Radio Boulbinet

INDIA - Electrical power plant

MIKE - Samory barracks

OSCAR - Republican Guard

PAPA - Isthmus

SIERRA - Airport

VICTOR - Patrol Boats

ZULU - PAIGC

On November 19th, eve of the departure, the commander-in-chief António de Spínola went to the island of Soga, to meet with the troops.

At 20H00, on November 20th 1970, TG 27-2, led by Alpoim Calvão, sailed away from the island of Soga. A P2V5 Portuguese Air Force plane overflew the Task Group, surveying the status of the route. Other air assets were kept on alert in support of the operation, particularly during the return to base.

The following day (21st), the ships reached unnoticed the outskirts of Conakry, at approximately 20H00. At the spreading point, each of the six vessels manoeuvred to the most suitable location for landing the teams on both shores of the city peninsula. The patrol boat Orion, flagship of the operation, anchored NNW of the jetty protecting the harbour, half a mile distant. Out of the remaining ones, three others anchored north of the city and the other two headed south.

  

Execution

The action was triggered at 01H45 on the 22nd, a Sunday, with complete surprise, when only nightlife places were open.

VICTOR team left Orion on rubber boats and headed for the break-water and the pier where the ships to be neutralized were moored. Once the sentry was eliminated, the team members entered the P6 patrol boats and started various fires by throwing hand grenades through the hatches. Running across the pontoon, they did the same to the three Komar who were alongside the wharf on the north side, returning afterward to the Orion.

In the meantime, team HOTEL left the landing craft Bombarda, in two rubber boats, in order to take control over Radio Boulbinet. However, after coming ashore, the team leader, a Portuguese officer, got confused and therefore unable to accomplish the mission. Consequently, the proclamation of the FNLG was never broadcasted.

Then, in two waves, rubber boats landed teams ALFA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA, ECHO, FOXTROT and GOLF. In the Gendarmerie barracks, initial strong resistance was found, but ultimately dominated; the remaining targets, in downtown Conakry, were seized with little opposition. However, Sekou Touré was not found at the presidential palace.

In turn, teams ÓSCAR, INDIA and MIKE, departure from the Large Landing Craft Montante, towards their objectives. The first, in rubber boats, headed the Republican Guard barracks. Here, after a fierce combat, achieved the complete control of the site, freeing about 400 existing prisoners. Teams INDIA and MIKE came ashore directly from the landing craft, that came alongside in the Yacht Club pier. Team INDIA managed to control the power plant, after neutralizing the guards. The power outage that followed plunged the city into darkness, contributing to the disorientation of the local forces.

Team MIKE marched for a kilometre and occupied, without resistance, Camp Samory, facing, subsequently, a motorized force that showed up at the site.

Team ZULU left the patrol boats Dragão and Cassiopeia in ten rubber boats, managing to reach land only at 02H15. Split into three groups, the first one headed to La Montaigne prison, where all the 26 Portuguese soldiers were held in captivity. After a short but violent combat with the local garrison, all the POW were released. The second group attacked the PAIGC headquarters, destroying buildings and vehicles and shooting down some fighters. Amílcar Cabral, leader of the PAIGC, was absent abroad, which was not known. The third group stormed the militia camp and Villa Silly, alternative residence of Sekou Touré, but he was not there either.

Finally, when team SIERRA came ashore, with the mission to occupy Conakry airport and to destroy the existing Mig-17 fighters planes, heavy gunfire was in progress in the city. The team went on a forced march up to the airport, which was seized without resistance. However, no Migs were there to be found.

It was during this march to the airport that Commando 1st Lieutenant Januário, a native of Portuguese Guinea and previously highly decorated by the Portuguese authorities, defected with twenty of his men.

The absence of the Migs caused a great deal of concern to the leadership of the operation, as it could give the enemy aerial supremacy. In such circumstances, an air attack against the fleet, at first light, was a likely prospect. This led Alpoim Calvão to terminate the operation at approximately 04H30, ordering the reembark of all forces. Finding out that the FLNG influence in Conakry was much less significant than what their leaders had promised was another factor contributing to this decision. Even so, some of the FLNG militants who took part in the operation chose to remain in Conakry, where, in the following days, engaged in fighting against Touré’s troops, although without any success.

The reembark took longer than desirable until the break of dawn.

According to the Portuguese military reports, the teams retrieval vessel manoeuvres were observed by a crowd of Guineans, who applauded enthusiastically the Portuguese military, believing they were witnessing the fall of Sékou Touré’s regime. As soon as all the teams were back on board, TG 27-2 sailed to the island of Soga, where it arrived by 16H25 the following day, November 23rd. The Portuguese suffered three dead and nine wounded (military), and inflicted to the enemy casualties estimated to be at about 500 killings (military and civilian).

  

Final remarks

From a strategic point of view, Operation “Mar Verde” was a complete failure. Touré’s regime trembled but did not fall and the position of the PAIGC in Guinea was not altered. It should be emphasized the success obtained with the destruction of patrol boats and the release of 26 Portuguese POW.

Following the operation, whose authorship the Portuguese government refused to recognize, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting, at the request of the Republic of Guinea, and an approved resolution demanded «immediate withdrawal of all armed forces and of all foreign mercenaries» out of the Republic of Guinea. On December 8th, resolution 290 of the Security Council was adopted, explicitly condemning Portugal for the invasion of Guinea and, for the first time, considering «the presence of Portuguese colonialism in Africa a serious threat to peace and security of independent African states». The resolution was adopted with 11 votes in favour; France, Spain, Great Britain and the United States abstained.

The idea still remaining nowadays is that the action against Conakry was a “shot in the dark”, far from the usual policy followed by the Portuguese government in developing friendly relations with the authorities and the populations of neighbouring countries, though hardly ever with success. The execution of such an operation always raised many questions, because if it had the success that their mentors and performers intended, that could trigger an escalation of violence, always unfavourable to the Portuguese regime and its colonial policy.

---

[1] ANTUNES, Freire, Cartas Particulares a Marcello Caetano, Publicações D. Quixote, Lisboa, 1985, Vol. I, p. 149.

 

ALCORA, UM SILÊNCIO DA GUERRA COLONIAL

No passado dia 27 de março participei no colóquio "Guerra Colonial - Memórias silenciadas" organizado, entre outros, pelo Centro de Estados Sociais da Universidade de Coimbra (CES/UC). O colóquio pretendia abordar e debater memórias que de algum modo andam silenciadas, tanto pelos organismos oficiais como pelos próprios protagonistas, no sentido de melhor se compreender a longa duração da guerra e o seu contributo para o 25 de Abril de 1974. No Portugal democrático faz cada vez menos sentido que se mantenham sombras persistentes sobre o tempo da Guerra Colonial.

A minha comunicação foi a seguinte:

Alcora, um silêncio da Guerra Colonial

 1.     O Exercício Alcora

Em 1961, faz agora 60 anos, Salazar optou pela guerra nos territórios coloniais africanos porque o seu regime não estava preparado para iniciar um processo longo e controverso de conversações com os nascentes movimentos de libertação.

Os fundamentos ideológicos do Estado Novo incluíam, desde a década de 30, o pilar do império colonial como essência da nação portuguesa, assente na sua dimensão pluricontinental e multirracial.

O mito dessa natureza intrínseca condicionou o pensamento da sociedade portuguesa, submetida à propaganda longa e persistente da ditadura.

Excluindo alguns movimentos resistentes, que viviam no estrangeiro ou na clandestinidade (e mesmo assim em formulações muito tardias), ninguém foi capaz de propor, com consistência, uma solução para o problema colonial.

Só em 1961, quando a questão da libertação colonial passara já ao terreno, é que se manifestou uma opção, dentro do regime, de questionamento da política de Salazar.

O chamado golpe Botelho Moniz, fomentado pela nova política americana da administração Kennedy, destinava-se a derrubar Salazar e a colocar em cima da mesa uma nova política colonial de autodeterminação.

Salazar conhecia os meandros da conspiração e preferiu opor-se a esse movimento para salvar o regime e o seu poder, do que socorrer as populações (brancas e negras) do Norte de Angola (cujos iminentes perigos bem conhecia), vindo a aproveitar-se, com deliberada insídia, dos massacres levados a cabo pela UPA sobre essas populações para uma intensa campanha de propaganda contra os movimentos de libertação e a favor da solução portuguesa de continuação da sua política colonial.

Uma vez iniciada, a guerra colonial só poderia terminar com o fim do regime.

Os capitães reconheceram esta realidade a partir de 1973, quando já iam passados 12 anos de empenhamento militar, ainda assim numa ação autónoma e com escassos contributos externos.

Desde 1960 e até ao seu fim, o regime do Estado Novo, primeiro com Salazar e depois com Marcelo Caetano, viu-se obrigado a canalizar toda a sua atenção para a guerra, assim como grande parte dos recursos humanos, materiais e financeiros do país. Mas os recursos de Portugal eram muito limitados e responder às ações da guerrilha nacionalista em três imensos territórios afigurava-se como tarefa excessiva.

Ainda por cima, o regime português estava isolado no concerto das nações e era objeto de sanções, restrições comerciais e contestação política, tanto no seio das Nações Unidas, como da maior parte dos países, mesmo dos mais importantes aliados integrantes da NATO.

Valendo-se do ambiente internacional da Guerra Fria, das hesitações geoestratégicas das grandes potências e das organizações militares, navegando à vista por entre a situação de conflito global latente, o regime português foi encontrando apoios e suportes para o seu esforço militar, muitas vezes de forma disfarçada ou mesmo encoberta.

Foi neste ambiente que se desenvolveram as relações entre Portugal e o regime de apartheid da África do Sul durante quase todo o período da guerra colonial.

Não cabendo aqui aprofundar o percurso dessas relações, mas apenas falar da sua fase final, será de destacar que os grandes projetos levados a efeitos em Angola e Moçambique tiveram sempre, como importantes parceiros, os interesses da África do Sul, como foram o plano do Cunene em Angola e a construção da barragem de Cabora Bassa em Moçambique.

Ao focarmos a nossa atenção no Exercício Alcora, não podemos dissociá-lo dos interesses de Portugal, enquanto potência colonial de fracos recursos e constante enfraquecimento das suas capacidades, e do conceito estratégico do regime sul-africano de manutenção do regime de supremacia branca na África Austral.

O regime português, depois da morte política de Salazar, em 1968, confrontou-se com a sua própria desagregação, minado por divergências, fações e lutas pelo poder que foram enfraquecendo a sua unidade, mesmo perante a questão chave da sua sobrevivência, a solução para a guerra colonial.

Acentuando esta luta interna, a guerra caminhou com alguma rapidez para um estreitamento de soluções, em especial pelo desenvolvimento da luta armada dos movimentos de libertação, que se aperfeiçoava e subia constantemente de patamar (em especial na Guiné e em Moçambique), mas também pelo crescente empenho das Nações Unidas que extremavam em contínuo a veemência das suas resoluções.   

É neste contexto que se situa o “Exercício Alcora”. Confluindo na evidência de um necessário apoio militar da África do Sul às operações das forças portuguesas, em especial no Sul e Sueste de Angola e na região de Tete em Moçambique (onde se construía Cabora Bassa), Portugal e a África do Sul traçam as bases de um acordo militar e de uma aliança política para a defesa de uma África Austral de supremacia branca.

Este plano é apoiado por uma importante fação do sistema político-militar português e pelo governo sul-africano.

A África do Sul implementava assim a sua estratégia de defesa, com o alargamento em profundidade das suas fronteiras de segurança aos territórios de Angola, Moçambique e também da Rodésia (trazida por si ao acordo tripartido).

O poder económico e militar da África do Sul parecia conceder às autoridades portuguesas um conforto material suficiente para o prolongamento de uma situação cujo desenlace, mais tarde ou mais cedo, era considerado inevitável mesmo pelos protagonistas desta solução.

Mas havia, subjacente ao acordo, uma contradição impossível de contornar.

Portugal afirmava-se como um país multirracial e a África do Sul era oficialmente um país de desenvolvimento separado, um país de apartheid.

É neste imbróglio doutrinário que assenta o secretismo da aliança.

Portugal não estava preparado para publicitar a aliança e a África do Sul queria afirmá-la perante o mundo.

Tudo o que envolvia esta aliança era tratado como se fosse segredo de Estado, e classificado como “Muito Secreto”.

Ao iniciar-se o ano de 1974, as tensões entre os dois parceiros em relação à publicitação da aliança atingiram um ponto de não retorno.

Da constatação desta impossibilidade, estavam a desenhar-se soluções espúrias, que ninguém sabia muito bem como poderiam acabar.

Assim, em relação à Guiné (que aliás já era um país independente, ilegalmente ocupado por Portugal) o governo português admitia a retração do dispositivo militar para a zona de Bissau e a preparação futura de uma saída das forças portuguesas, se as conversações que procurou entabular com o PAIGC não produzissem (como não produziram) resultados positivos.

Em relação a Moçambique a questão permanecia obscura, mantendo-se sempre a possibilidade de retomar os esforços de Jorge Jardim para uma difícil solução acordada com a Frelimo através do governo de Lusaca.

Em relação a Angola, a solução passava por uma independência branca, fomentada por Lisboa e apoiada pela África do Sul, sem que seja claro, ainda hoje, como iria ser justificado o processo perante a comunidade internacional e mesmo perante as forças armadas portuguesas (que em grande parte desconheciam em absoluto o que se preparava).

O longo conflito armado estava às portas de um absurdo, tanto no processo de independência fabricado por altas figuras do Estado português, como nas reações dos movimentos de libertação, das populações negras e da comunidade branca, assim como das forças militares portuguesas. E mesmo de outras fações dentro do regime.

 A ação do MFA em 25 de Abril de 1974 pôs fim, não só ao projeto, como ao próprio regime.

 O que se infere hoje, como resultado de um conjunto de investigações sobre o assunto, é que só a conjugação da intransigência inerente à política colonial do regime e o desespero da situação militar deu origem à aceitação de absurdas soluções de uma questão muito maior que os protagonistas da aliança secreta.

 

2.     Uma notável investigação recente

Existe hoje uma notável investigação e estudo da História de África, em várias partes do mundo. O destaque é devido aos jovens (e outros menos jovens) historiadores, incluindo muitos africanos, sem enfeudamentos às narrativas heroicas.

Estudos recentes sobre a colonização e a descolonização, que nos fornecem instrumentos para nos situarmos perante as polémicas e os oportunismos, estão também em curso, vencendo ocultações, com serenidade, com enquadramento, com contexto e com verdade.

A pertinência de um olhar historiográfico abrangente, na procura de um equilíbrio em relação à extensa literatura colonial anterior, em que os temas antes na penumbra e esquecimento se tornam obrigatórios, como a violência, a discriminação, o racismo, a ausência, o domínio, a exclusão, não pode, ainda assim, excluir as influências mútuas, as lutas comuns, a construção de relações de cooperação e a visão de um mundo novo, emergente do fim dos impérios.

É consolador verificar que entre nós se têm desenvolvido projetos, estudos, programas, em especial no âmbito universitário, que refletem esse esforço de conhecimento do mundo africano e das suas relações históricas e atuais.

O mesmo se pode dizer sobre o período da guerra colonial / guerras da independência, revistas sob os mais variados aspetos, um dos quais se fixa precisamente nas memórias silenciadas, nas geografias imaginadas e nas alianças secretas.

Temos assistido à construção de uma ideia sobre a ausência de estudos sérios, da fuga ao tema, da inexistência de investigação e do desinteresse sobre um período fundamental para a compreensão da nossa história comum, de Portugal e dos novos países. Ora nada disso me parece verdadeiro.

Primeiro, existe um largo e crescente interesse da universidade pelos temas africanos e pelas relações coloniais e em especial pelo período final da libertação, incluindo, portanto, a guerra colonial, o processo de transição para as independências e a transferência de soberanias.

Editam-se e publicam-se obras, memórias, estudos, literatura, a um ritmo assinalável sobre temas relacionados com este período fulcral do pós-2ª Guerra Mundial até ao período de pós-independências.

Tem-se consolidado, nas redes sociais, um imenso manancial de informação e de participação de inúmeros testemunhos, bem difícil de acompanhar.

Estão abertos os arquivos portugueses (e também dos novos países), dentro das suas limitações orgânicas, com poucas restrições ou nenhumas.

Existem projetos de recolha de memórias pessoais, de audição de protagonistas, de entrevistas coletivas, de recuperação de testemunhos.

Fazem-se inúmeros colóquios, seminários, congressos, teses de mestrado e doutoramento sobre este período recente da História Contemporânea, com múltiplas abordagens, tanto na perspetiva colonial, como da luta pela autonomia e independência, como também das relações do colonialismo.

Em contrapartida, há ainda muitas matérias por abordar, muitos estudos por fazer, muitas explicações para formular, muitas atitudes para compreender.

São estas incertezas que nos trazem a este encontro, onde procuramos explicar melhor os silêncios que resistem e os assuntos que teimam em permanecer na sombra.

 

3.     Silêncios e encobrimentos

O 25 de Abril de 1974 traçou uma fronteira entre a anterior prática colonial e a mudança para um novo destino do mundo colonizado. Mas, em rigor, as sobrevivências foram inevitáveis e as continuidades conceptuais mantiveram-se resistentes.

A forma como os protagonistas encaram o mundo não é fácil de alterar, e nem as roturas profundas conseguem impedir a continuidade das mentalidades e das correntes de pensamento anteriores.

Cabe-nos a nós, como historiadores e outros estudiosos das sociedades investigar, interpretar e explicar os fenómenos e os acontecimentos que geraram as comunidades que somos hoje, assim como combater as falsidades, as ocultações e mesmo os esquecimentos que continuam ativos. Tudo, segundo julgo, com a persistência e a serenidade que os nossos contemporâneos nos merecem e nos exigem.

 

Muito obrigado.

 

27-03-2021

 

THE LAST PORTUGUESE COLONIAL CAMPAIGN (1961-1974)

Em 2010, o Congresso da Comissão Internacional de História Militar realizou-se em Amesterdão. Eu e o David Martelo tivemos ocasião de apresentar uma comunicação sobre a Guerra Colonial, dando dela uma visão geral e abordando os principais tópicos. Publico agora o texto então apresentado.

 

THE LAST PORTUGUESE COLONIAL CAMPAIGN (1961-1974)

Aniceto Afonso

David Martelo

 

1. The idea of Empire as a historical legacy

The dictatorship that ruled Portugal since 1926 saw the Portuguese empire inherited from the Age of Discovery and the Conference of Berlin, as the essence of the nation and defining condition of Portugal as a people with unique characteristics. It used to its advantage the pride of the Portuguese over the epic era of the discoveries.

The resolutions of the Conference of Berlin forced Portugal to a huge military and financial effort. The climate of insecurity discouraged the influx of immigrants, adding then to the problem the outcome of World War I, which led to the opening of front lines in Angola and Mozambique, both adjoining German territories.

After World War II, Salazar prevented any discussion over the colonial territories, assuming the uncompromising defense of Portugal as a multi-continental and multiracial nation.

In the meantime, with the approval of the UN Charter, an international legal and political framework was being built that would put an end to colonialism.

While the governments of other colonial powers prepared the transfer of authority in colonial territories, Portugal informed the UN (1956) that it did not have any territory under its administration that was not autonomous, as described in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, thereby creating the conditions for the political isolation and the outbreak of armed conflicts. The nationalist movements that were being formed in the Portuguese colonies ended up having the widest support of African partners, the USSR, the non-aligned countries and not few western countries.

At the end of 1960, the General Assembly of the United Nations approved motions that explicitly contradicted the Portuguese position. All territories under Portuguese administration were declared as falling under classification of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.

  

2. Beginning of armed struggle in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique

When, in 1961, armed struggle in Angola began, most African colonies had already achieved their independence. The existence of independent countries, sharing borders with the Portuguese territories, became a cause for serious concerns, as were potential bases of operations against these territories.

The actions of the guerrillas began in Angola on February 4th, 1961. Later, on 15th and 16^th March, hundreds of whites, blacks and non-whites were murdered, most of which from the blows of machetes. With the military forces available - 1,500 European troops and about 5,000 natives - and no air assets (helicopters) that could move them quickly to the threatened sites, people had no other recourse than conduct their own defense, until the arrival of rescue parties.

The armed action against the Portuguese presence spilled over to other territories. In Guinea, from 1963 onwards, while in Mozambique, FRELIMO's first action took place in 1964.

The Portuguese Armed Forces found themselves then constrained to a deep restructuring and refocusing of its core mission, from NATO's European commitments to the confrontation of an enemy that would use guerrilla warfare in areas far wider than that of Portugal, with different physical characteristics and located thousands of miles away.

It was necessary a complete change in the type of combat units, in the doctrines to be applied, the amount of troops to mobilize and the type of disposition that would take into account the threats to be faced and the complex logistical issues that would be present.

  

3. The ungrateful task of winning the population

The Portuguese doctrine of counter-insurgency was based on the general principle of winning minds and hearts. It was not for lack of theory or of bureaucratic structures that this conquest maneuver failed, but because of bad practices in the field.

With the exception of populations which were assimilated and urbanized, the target groups of the psychological action of the Portuguese military could be found in three distinct cases: out of the zones of action of the guerrillas; under control of the guerrillas; or in undefined situation of cross-fires or runaway.

For the people living near the barracks or in "not subverted" areas, the army could keep them under control with a good neighborhood policy in which health support was administered, some school activity provided to children and that supported the construction of basic infrastructure - roads, wells, housing and schools.

In areas of low or no presence of the Portuguese authorities, in border areas where the liberation movements were trying to establish themselves and in regions of ethnic conflict, there were still people in the difficult position between crossfires. These unbalanced populations, were of the more difficult approach and relationship, and the Portuguese forces were not able, in general, to draw them and win their confidence.

 As a rule, relations with the population never had in view their integration in a multiracial society, as preached, or their participation in community life. The diminutive benefits received by urban populations or in controlled areas cannot form the basis of analysis of a conflicted relationship, which always put into question the very way of life of most rural populations.

  

4. International support for liberation movements and political isolation of Portugal

After the independence of Malawi and Zambia, in 1964, the siege of Angola and Mozambique tightened, increasing the border points for infiltrations.

But not all countries were hostile to neighbouring Portugal. South Africa, dominated by the white minority, supported the Portuguese military effort, as did Rhodesia, from the unilateral declaration of independence in 1965. Thus, a block emerged in the region that supported the permanence of the descendants of European settlers.

In the relations of the Portuguese regime with the world, during the war, we can consider that the vast majority of countries were clearly hostile. And that, of this hostile world, stood up the countries of the socialist bloc, the Third World and the Nordic countries.

Nevertheless, there were also countries that we might consider indulgent (and cooperating), such as Germany, France, Britain the United States and the so called "brother countries", such as Spain and Brazil (the latter after 1964), in spite of their respective different options.

  

5. The ineffectiveness of the grid system and the increase of Special Forces intervention

After some first emergency reinforcements sent to Angola in 1961, the strengthening of the garrison takes the form of a large expedition which, with undeniable enthusiasm, will allow the reoccupation of areas dominated by the Union of Peoples of Angola, over a period of war with a very different feature of what was going to happen from the last quarter of 1961 onwards. Once restored the Portuguese authority, it was decided to occupy the territory in order to highlight the presence of Portuguese troops. Whichever peace was reaching in areas affected by initial terrorism the grid disposition would be adopted, which would last until the end of the war.

This disposition, with the territory divided into sectors, strongly influenced the conduct of the Portuguese troops, because the importance given to the control of the ground, forcing the dispersal of resources made them assume a defensive posture. Furthermore, conditioned by the logistics system, the troops remained with few means to achieve rapid and effective offensive operations, and the initiative passed, largely, to the enemy. They always knew where the Portuguese troops stayed and what their routines were, choosing the best opportunity to attack and enjoying the huge advantage of, without great risk, using the placement of explosive devices on roads and paths, to cause large numbers of demoralizing casualties.

For this type of war, it was necessary to recast the doctrine of the infantry (and the cavalry and artillery, who fought as infantry), highlighting the security techniques, reaction to ambush, tracking and neutralization of mines and traps, along with their preparation for the psychological maneuver.

 Regarding the means to fight, the Portuguese Armed Forces never achieved levels of quality and quantity consistent with the times when the conflict took place. In a war characterized by the actions of fire by surprise, lack of protection for the infantrymen was total, and they operated in areas prone to ambushes with soft skin vehicles.

For this reason, the land-mines warfare became extremely profitable; especially because infantry units were not equipped with rolling minesweepers equipment and the electromagnetic detectors they used were obsolete and rarely assigned to units.

The lack of resources and difficulty to acquire modern communication means added to these difficulties another adverse factor hurting troop morale: the frequent inability to call for air support in a timely manner, not only in combat but for medical evacuation also.

 The lassitude of life within the grid-disposed units caused them to worry especially with their own survival. The absence of modern technology, the reduced mobility and the progressive improvement of means by enemy forces represented a difficult burden to overcome. Then, it is quite understandable the growing importance of the Special Forces (Commandos, Paratroopers and Special Marines), coexisting, therefore, two types of ground forces. On one hand, the Special Forces, well trained, better equipped and possessing highly mobile tactics. Geared to offensive missions, these forces showed aggressiveness and motivation, and occasional extremely violent and high-risk sacrifices were asked of them. On the other hand, there were the grid units, poorly trained, poorly equipped and with low mobility, subject to action by the enemy along the required progression itineraries and in some cases, to the attacks on the barracks, suffering the effects of isolation and discomfort of bad lodgings.

  

6. A policy without the corresponding means

The spirit of routine and gradual discouragement succeeded the enthusiasm felt by troops in 1961.

In Guinea, in 1968, the worsening of the situation conditioned the military disposition to the point of starting to be considered the abandoning of some military facilities. In contrast, it was sought to improve self-defense and the reorganization of the population. The disposition retraction had, however, a negative consequence: this scheme gave the guerrilla forces zones for free, internationally referred to as "liberated zones". From 1973, the PAIGC proved that it was able to force a retraction of the disposition, as was the case of the withdrawal of Portuguese forces from the border post of Guileje.

In Mozambique, the commander-in-chief, General Kaúlza de Arriaga, believed he could reach a major victory by means of a direct action on FRELIMO. With this end in sight, in 1970, he launched operations “Gordian Knot" and "Border". It was a period of intense operational activity, with frequent contacts and mine blasts. The Portuguese forces saw the number of casualties rise to values never before reached, much of which were due to land-mines.

Unlike what happened in conventional operations, the seizing of territory was not part of the objective of the guerrillas, so the forces of FRELIMO had no reluctance in seeking other areas to continue their action. A desirable goal was the hydroelectric power plant of Cahora Bassa, in Tete.

The Portuguese troops were still engaged in both operations and the already mentioned political and military activity of FRELIMO around the dam revealed to be worrying.

But a new front was being opened. The Portuguese government had always sought the support of the Catholic Church, reiterating that Portugal defended the Western Christian civilization in Africa. However, the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations provided the development of an anti-colonial philosophy, which, slowly, would make its way into the mind of the Church. In 1963 the encyclical "Pacem in Terris” of Pope John XXIII came as the first sign of new thinking of the Church on colonial matters.

On July 1, 1970, pope Paul VI received in audience three leaders of the movements that fought Portugal: Amilcar Cabral (PAIGC), Agostinho Neto (MPLA) and Marcelino dos Santos (FRELIMO). This hearing had the symbolism of the final cut of the Church's support to the Portuguese presence overseas.

 

7. Personnel status

In early 1974, the garrisons of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique reached a total strength close to 170,000 men, about 100,000 of whom from the European part of Portugal. It represented, in proportion to their populations, a force more than fourfold that of the U.S. in Vietnam.

 

If the global strength had widened, the same could not be said of the important portion of the framework guaranteed by regular army officers. Young candidates to military academies were fewer and fewer.

 

Levels of conscription had also failed to meet the needs. Since 1967, it had reached the limit of capacity in the metropolis, so it was necessary to resort to local recruitment. Apart from the creation of almost entirely African units, 'mixing' of units from the metropolis, which came to theaters of operations incomplete, was also done, getting full strength with African personnel. The Africanization of the war was far more extensive than we imagine. In Mozambique, for example, locally drafted personnel represented, in 1974, more than half of the garrison.

  

  8. The Portuguese revolution of 25th April 1974 and the end of the Empire

The last year of the war (1974) was deeply marked by political and military unrest in Portugal, by the revolution of April 25th and by the negotiations of cease-fires in the three territories in war.

The struggle of the captains, initially of a corporate nature, began to gain political overtones from the beginning of 1974.

It was also then that the war in Mozambique spread to the center of the territory, affecting areas hitherto considered safe and launching panic among the white population.

In Guinea, the guerrilla intensified actions against several barracks, showing an increasing ground and anti-aircraft firepower. To worsen the circumstances, even in Angola, where an agreement with UNITA had created the illusion of a victory in the East, the situation slipped to an unexpected deterioration. Broken the agreement, UNITA returned to being considered an enemy force.

In February 1974, the book "Portugal and the Future" came out authored by General Antonio de Spinola, a former governor and commander-in-chief of Guinea. By proposing a political solution to the wars in Africa, Spinola became an opponent of the government. This event turned out to strengthen the spirit of rebellion that had already spread among younger officers.

Subsequently, Generals Spinola and Costa Gomes, this one the Chief-of-Defense, did not attend a ceremony in support of overseas policy, organized by the generals of the three services of the Armed Forces, and were discharged by the government.

On April 25, 1974, the revolution came to the streets, and without bloodshed, the Armed Forces Movement overthrew the dictatorship.

After having been published, the Programme of the Movement clearly showed that the measures on the overseas issue, while claiming that the solution was political, not military, were not clear enough to be readily accepted by the movements that fought against Portugal. It was followed, therefore, by a painful process of about three months, with little advance in negotiations. Concerning the military situation, while in Guinea a tacit cease-fire allowed significant advance in the peace process, in Angola and Mozambique the opposite took place, that is the guerrilla movements intensified their action against the Portuguese troops, increasingly demoralized before the hesitation of the political process.

Only from July 26, the day of adoption of Law 7/74 (recognizing the right of the colonies to self-determination and independence), the negotiations with the liberation movements were clarified, leading to the establishment of several cease-fires, a process completed in October 1974. In the meantime, on September 10th, Portugal had recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau.

Talks were then prepared to resolve the main problem in this area: the decolonization of Angola, where there were three movements in arms and not just one. In early 1975, a summit among the three parties and the Portuguese government was held, in which an understanding for the decolonization of Angola was found, a process that, however, would result in a civil war.

In June 1975, the independence of Mozambique was proclaimed and, the following month, the Cape Verde and S. Tome and Principe. Finally, in November 11, already in a climate of civil war, the date for the independence of Angola was reached. The last Portuguese troops who had been present in the Portuguese colonial empire returned to Portugal, and for several years civil conflict in Angola continued, interspersed with foreign military assistance from Zaire, South Africa and Cuba.

The end of the colonial era provided the Portuguese not only the enjoyment of freedom and the realization of what this value implied, but also a reformulation of their destiny. The cycle of the Empire had been closed.